Two Ends of One Label: GMEB Barely Fell, DJTB Is the Widest Common Stock on the Book

TL;DR

These five instruments share a label. They share no behaviour.

• AMCB is one of only 18 instruments on the book that are positive over 30 days (+2.27%), against a book median of −16.71% and 82 instruments negative.
• Only 18 instruments sit above the midpoint of their own since-listing range, and both GMEB (62.3%) and AMCB (52.4%) are among them — two of this group of five, a ninth of that entire list.
• DJTB, in the same group, is the 3rd-widest instrument on the book and the widest common stock (3.212x). Only two 2x leveraged ETFs are wider. Its 30-day figure is −38.12%, it sits −67.5% from its high, and it is pinned at 2.0% of its range.
• The methodological limit comes first: GMEB (2026-08-11) and DJTB (2026-08-25) were each the only instrument listed on their day, so the two most important members have no same-batch control at all — the window-controlled comparison every prior report in this series leaned on is simply unavailable for them.
• In all three batches where a control does exist, the narrative stock is narrower or level: HIMSB 1.197x against CRMB (Salesforce) 1.186x, 0.9% apart; GPROB 1.519x against RDDTB (Reddit) 1.834x, 17% narrower; AMCB 1.249x against AGPUB 1.945x and CYPHB 1.835x over an identical window, the narrowest of the three. Three for three, all pointing the other way.
• Strip GMEB and group turnover goes from 0.5495x to 1.375x. GMEB alone is 68.0% of group market cap but does only 19.8% of group volume, and its 0.160x turnover is the 3rd-lowest on the book.
• This snapshot cannot compute a premium. There is no underlying reference price and no dividend reinvestment multiplier, so this report gives no premium or discount figure — that is not an omission, it is not computable.

1. What these five are

bStocks is Binance's own tokenized-equity issuer (issuing entity BTech Holdings Limited, ADGM / FSRA listed certificates, single chain BNB Chain, Binance-only trading). CoinMarketCap reports 105 instruments; this report uses a snapshot of 100 of them, timestamped 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z.

The underlyings are the US equities that have been traded on story rather than on filings for the past few years: two 2021 meme stocks, one politically themed stock, one pandemic-era telehealth name, one hardware company whose turnaround has been announced repeatedly.

The five together hold $9.73M of market cap, 0.7% of the book's $1,318.38M, and $5.35M of volume, 0.6% of the book's $873.46M.

Two details to put down here: GPROB at $0.96 is the lowest unit price among the 100 (next lowest CYPHB $2.98, then AMCB $3.07); and all five listed on different days, with no two sharing a date — which turns into a methodological problem in section 3.

2. Both ends: GMEB and AMCB in the upper half, DJTB pinned at the bottom

Of the 100 instruments, 82 are negative over 30 days, with a median of −16.71%. This group spreads across the whole distribution:

Two things hold at the same time, and they point in opposite directions.

First: GMEB and AMCB are in a book-wide minority. Only 18 instruments on the book sit above the midpoint of their own since-listing range, and this group contributes 2 of them — GMEB 62.3% and AMCB 52.4%. Separately, only 18 instruments are positive over 30 days, and AMCB at +2.27% is one of those.

The top four of those 18 positive names are SOXSB +70.82%, SQQQB +24.94%, LLYB +21.31% and UVXYB +20.12% — two inverse ETFs, one pharmaceutical stock, one volatility ETF. In other words, on this snapshot the property of not having fallen over 30 days belongs mostly to short instruments and defensive assets, and AMCB entered that list as a meme stock.

Second: DJTB is at the other end, and the other end here is book-wide. Its range width of 3.212x ranks 3rd among all 100, behind INTWB 5.583x and SNXXB 3.243x — both 2x leveraged ETFs. DJTB is therefore the widest common stock on the book. It is −67.5% from its since-listing high and sits at 2.0% of its range, the deepest of the five and the deepest of any ordinary instrument this series has examined.

Both of those facts live inside one five-instrument group. So the sentence retail narrative stocks collapse together once the narrative ends is false for this group: two of them are in the upper half, one is at the widest point on the book, and the other two are in between.

3. The counter-example: the two most important members have no control, and the three that do all point the other way

Every prior report in this series ran the same machine: compare instruments listed on the same day, so the window is identical and window length stops being a variable. This section has to start by saying that the machine runs three times here out of three available, and the two runs that matter most cannot be made at all.

GMEB and DJTB have no same-batch control. Only GMEB listed on 2026-08-11, and only DJTB on 2026-08-25. So DJTB's 3.212x has no window-controlled reference — it cannot be shown to be wide because of a political theme, and it cannot be shown not to be. The 67-day window is neither long nor short on this book, but there is no other instrument with a 67-day window to compare it against.

This has to be written down plainly, because the widest common stock on the book, from section 2, reads very easily as this group's conclusion. It is a fact, but it is not a controlled fact.

The other three do have controls, and all three go the other way:

Three batches, the same direction three times: the narrative stock is not wider than its same-day control.

Item by item:

• HIMSB against CRMB is the cleanest pair. Same listing day, same 53-day window. One is a telehealth narrative name, the other is Salesforce — widths 1.197x and 1.186x, 0.9% apart. The narrative label buys no extra volatility here.
• GPROB against RDDTB is more interesting, because RDDTB is arguably a narrative stock itself. Reddit is where the 2021 episode happened. Over the same 46-day window, RDDTB at 1.834x is 17% wider than GPROB at 1.519x, and RDDTB is −36.40% over 7 days, 2nd-worst on the book. It is not in this group, and it fits the description of a violently moving narrative stock better than this group's members do. Which says the grouping is a human choice — drawn by someone else, RDDTB might be inside it.
• AMCB is the narrowest of its own batch of three. Its same-day peers AGPUB 1.945x and CYPHB 1.835x are both of the type covered in the group with no public anchor (listing status unclassified). A 40-year-old cinema chain moved less than two instruments whose underlying listing status has not even been confirmed.

So this section ends in two sentences. First, on the three members where a window-controlled comparison is possible, the claim that narrative stocks are more volatile is rejected three times. Second, on the member that supports that claim most (DJTB), the comparison cannot be run — it was the only instrument listed that day, so there is no control with a matching window.

4. Strip GMEB and this group's turnover doubles

Group turnover is 0.5495x, below the other 95 instruments' 0.6634x. That number is almost entirely decided by one instrument.

GMEB alone is 68.0% of group market cap but does only 19.8% of group volume. Strip it and the remaining four turn over at 1.375x — from below the book to 2.07x the book.

GMEB's own numbers are extreme: turnover 0.1604x is the 3rd-lowest on the book (above only AMATB 0.1297x and COHRB 0.1412x), while its $6.61M market cap ranks 34th of 100. An upper-middle market cap paired with the 3rd-lowest turnover on the book.

The other four sit at the opposite end: GPROB 2.167x, AMCB 2.011x, DJTB 1.392x, while HIMSB's 0.245x is the 10th-lowest and its $183.2K of volume ranks 96th.

So the internal shape of this group is: one large instrument being held, one small instrument being held, one collapsing, and two being turned over fast. Any group average describes none of them.

One basis reminder: turnover = 24h volume ÷ market cap, so a small denominator mechanically inflates the ratio. GPROB's 2.167x is built on $489.9K of market cap with $1.06M of absolute volume — the same order of magnitude as GMEB's $1.06M. Two instruments traded the same dollar amount that day and their turnover ratios differ by 13.5x.

5. Putting this group back in the book

By listing month:

Two members listed in August (GMEB / DJTB) and three in September (HIMSB / GPROB / AMCB). And the two August members happen to straddle the book's two extremes — GMEB is the most resilient shape in that batch, DJTB is the widest common stock on the book.

On size: only 7 instruments on the book are above $50M and 12 above $25M, while 61 are below $5M and 33 below $1M, with a median of $2.39M. Only GMEB ($6.61M) is above the median here; the other four are all below $1.20M.

6. Structure: five instruments, one wrapper

• The wrapper is a tracker certificate, not equity. Issuing entity BTech Holdings Limited, ADGM / FSRA listed certificates.
• No voting rights.
• Dividends pass through: a 30% US withholding deduction first, then reinvestment through a multiplier (see section 8).
• Reserves are attested, not proven on chain. For comparison, xStocks uses Chainlink proof of reserve — updated daily or when reserves move more than 10%, verifiable on chain. An attestation is not.
• Redemption requires KYC, with a $5 minimum.
• US persons are blocked.
• Single chain. BNB Chain only, BSC deposits only; sending on the wrong network loses the assets.

That is a structural description, not an accusation. It carries one specific implication for this group, tied directly to these underlyings: no voting rights. Several of these five US stocks had, in the years after 2021, a direct relationship between retail ownership and shareholder votes, annual meetings, and corporate governance itself. The tokenized version moved the price exposure on chain and moved none of the shareholder rights — holding GMEB is not holding GameStop shares, there is no vote, and dividends arrive after a 30% US withholding deduction and reinvestment through a multiplier. For a narrative whose core claim was that retail ownership changed the company, that is a structural difference, not a detail.

7. This snapshot was taken on a Saturday

The timestamp 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z is a Saturday morning UTC. The US cash market closed Friday at 20:00 UTC and does not reopen until Monday. All five underlyings here are US-listed, so at the instant of this snapshot not one of the five reference prices exists.

This has already been quantified once on the same issuer: one stock, four books laid AAPL's four tokenized versions side by side on a Saturday and concluded that a quote outside trading hours is a market maker's opinion, not a market price.

The 24-hour change window used here (Friday 06:06 UTC to Saturday 06:06 UTC) contains a full Friday US session, so it is not purely a closed-market quote; but the snapshot itself lands inside the closure, and for the two-plus days until Monday these token prices are the only prices these names have.

One extra layer for this group: the intraday moves of these five underlyings have historically tracked the rhythm of social media, and social media does not stop at the weekend. This snapshot cannot test that (no tick data, no underlying reference price), but it means the point about token prices being the only price during a closure matters more here than it does for a broad-market ETF.

8. What this method cannot compute

First, no premium or discount. The snapshot holds only the token's own price and no underlying reference price. More importantly, the bStocks dividend mechanism is a 30% US withholding deduction followed by reinvestment through a multiplier — without knowing the current multiplier, token unit price and share price are not comparable quantities. So this report gives no premium figure; it is not computable, not forgotten.

Second, no shares per token. The snapshot holds no conversion ratio. GPROB's 510,896 circulating units cannot be converted into any share count without it.

Third, GMEB and DJTB have no same-batch control, and that is this report's largest methodological hole. Each was the only instrument listed on its day, so the widest common stock on the book from section 2 is an uncontrolled fact. This report does not attribute it to narrative, because there is nothing to control the window against.

Fourth, the range-width windows are unequal. This group runs 39 / 46 / 53 / 67 / 81 days. Book-wide width comparisons are restricted to the 46 instruments listed 100 days or more — none of these five is in that 46 — so section 2's widths enter no statistic beyond their book-wide rank, and section 3 uses same-day listings throughout.

Fifth, market cap is the CMC definition: price × circulating supply. The book total of $1,318.38M here is the sum of these 100 rows, while this site's /stocks page shows bStocks at $914M of on-chain value — two figures from different sources at different moments, and they will not reconcile. This report uses the former throughout and states the timestamp everywhere.

Sixth, 100 of 105. CMC reports 105 instruments; the snapshot in hand holds 100. The missing 5 are in no statistic here.

Seventh, retail narrative stocks is a layer this report drew itself, and section 3 has already exposed the problem with that. The snapshot has no such field. RDDTB qualifies under the same standard and is wider than four of this group's five members — drawn by someone else, the numbers in sections 2 and 3 would change. This is not a classification that came from the data.

Conclusion. The most defensible finding here is a negation: retail narrative stocks does not correspond to one behaviour. Only 18 instruments on the book sit above the midpoint of their own range, and both GMEB (62.3%) and AMCB (52.4%) are among them, while AMCB's +2.27% puts it in the book's 18-name positive list — a list headed by two inverse ETFs, a pharmaceutical stock and a volatility ETF. DJTB, in the same group, is the 3rd-widest instrument on the book and the widest common stock (3.212x), pinned at 2.0% of its range.

And the claim that narrative stocks are more volatile is rejected everywhere it can be tested. HIMSB and Salesforce are 0.9% apart on width, GPROB is 17% narrower than Reddit, and AMCB is the narrowest of its own batch of three. On DJTB, the member that supports the claim most, the test cannot be run — it was the only instrument listed that day, with no window-matched control.

One more point about group averages: strip GMEB and this group's turnover goes from 0.5495x to 1.375x. An instrument holding 68.0% of group market cap while doing 19.8% of group volume can decide the appearance of the whole group on its own — when you see a group average, first ask whether one member is deciding it.

Data from CoinMarketCap, timestamped 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z, covering 100 of the 105 instruments bStocks has reported. Instrument detail and quotes at /stocks/bstocks. This is research, not investment advice. DYOR.