Same drawdown depth, opposite direction: what one 30-day number cannot tell you

TL;DR

Four of these names are at almost exactly the same drawdown depth, and yet the direction of the last week is opposite - because "how far below the high" and "still falling or already bouncing" are two different questions, and the 30-day column of this snapshot only answers the first.

• Below their post-listing highs: ASTSB −45.3%, RDDTB −43.9%, AXTIB −43.4%, RKLBB −36.4%. The book median on that column is −27.1% and 43 instruments are below −30% - all four of these are deeper.
• But three are up over 7 days: AXTIB +5.50%, RKLBB +5.13%, ASTSB +3.24%, against 30-day figures of −31.51%, −23.69% and −32.69%. The damage is older than one week.
• RDDTB is the exact inverse: its 7-day loss of −36.40% is larger than its 30-day loss of −36.31%. It was therefore slightly higher 7 days ago than it was 30 days ago - the entire month of damage is compressed into the final week - and it fell another −12.81% in 24 hours.
• APPB has been listed 5 days, and its 7-day and 30-day fields are identical (both −16.11%). That is proof the field is clipped to available history; 15 instruments on this book have been listed under 30 days.
• This timing split is not a sector signal. Of the 100 instruments, 45 are up over 7 days, and 21 of those are simultaneously down more than 20% over 30 days - one fifth of the book is doing the same thing, and this group only accounts for 3 of them.
• Size explains the direction but not the order. The largest name, RKLBB, has the lowest turnover (0.402x) and the smallest, RDDTB, the highest (3.695x) - yet AXTIB is 1.65 times the market cap of ASTSB with turnover 62% higher.
• This snapshot cannot produce a premium. There is no underlying reference price and no dividend reinvestment multiplier.

1. What these five are

bStocks is the Binance-operated on-chain equity issuer (entity BTech Holdings Limited, ADGM / FSRA listed certificates, a single chain in BNB Chain, traded only on Binance). CoinMarketCap reports 105 instruments; the snapshot used here covers 100 of them, timestamped 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z.

The five add up to $15.77M of market cap, 1.2% of the $1,318.38M book, and $13.00M of volume, 1.5% of the $873.46M total.

The underlyings fall into two buckets: space and communications (rocket launch, direct-to-handset low-earth-orbit satellites) and materials and platforms (compound semiconductor substrates, a mobile advertising platform, a community platform). This is the least homogeneous group of the six covered here - these names are together not because the businesses are adjacent, but because on this particular book they are all small and all badly beaten.

2. Four names at the same drawdown depth

Across the 100 instruments, the median distance below the post-listing high is −27.1% and 43 are below −30%; the median position in range is 22.4%.

The first four land inside a band 9 percentage points wide (−36.4% to −45.3%), all of them deeper than the book median. The APPB row has to be handled separately: it has been listed 5 days, and both the −16.1% and the 1.211x are artefacts of a window that short.

But at the same depth, this metric is covering two completely different situations. RDDTB and AXTIB are 0.5 percentage points apart on distance-from-high (−43.9% against −43.4%), and nine times apart on position in range (3.4% against 30.5%) - because the AXTIB range is far wider (2.658x against 1.834x), and the same drawdown depth leaves room above the bottom in a wide range while pinning you to it in a narrow one.

This is why distance-from-high and position-in-range have to be read together. On the first alone these four are one situation. Read with the second, RDDTB is sitting on its own low (price $92.14 against a post-listing low of $89.57, 2.9% above it) while AXTIB is still a third of the way up its own range.

3. Opposite directions

Put the 7-day and the 30-day side by side and these four split in two immediately:

Three names are up between 3.24% and 5.50% over the last 7 days while their 30-day figures are down between 23.69% and 32.69%. That means the damage happened more than 7 days ago and the last week has been a recovery.

RDDTB is the strict inverse: its 7-day loss (−36.40%) is 0.09 percentage points larger than its 30-day loss (−36.31%). There is only one way that ordering can happen: 7 days ago its price was slightly higher than it was 30 days ago. Put differently, the whole loss inside the 30-day window sits in the final 7 days, and the three weeks before that were net positive. It then fell another −12.81% in 24 hours, the deepest in the group on the day - at the moment of this snapshot that instrument was still falling, rather than sitting at the bottom of a completed drawdown.

The APPB row is a different kind of problem. It has been listed 5 days, and its 7-day and 30-day fields are identical (both −16.11%) - not a coincidence, but the field being clipped to available history. Its 24-hour figure is −8.70%, which means more than half of its entire recorded decline happened on the final day.

Dropped into one 30-day column, all three of these situations look the same: −31.51%, −36.31% and −16.11% read as three negative numbers of differing depth. In fact the first describes something that happened a month ago, the second something that happened last week, and the third covers only 5 days. The 30-day column of this snapshot carries no timing information, so it cannot on its own tell you whether an instrument is falling or recovering.

4. Counter-example: this is not a sector signal

The split in the previous section reads easily as "space and materials is bouncing". Put it back against the whole book and that explanation disappears.

Of the 100 instruments, 45 are up over 7 days (7-day median −0.74%), and 21 of those are simultaneously down more than 20% over 30 days:

AAOIB, AGPUB, ALABB, AMATB, ASTSB, AXTIB, BEB, COHRB, CRDOB, CRWVB, DRAMB, FLNCB, GLWB, KORUB, MUUB, RKLBB, SKHYB, SMCIB, STXB, USARB, WDCB.

Only 3 of the 21 belong to this group; the other 18 span semiconductors, storage hardware, optics, AI data centres and leveraged ETFs. In other words more than a fifth of the book is doing the same thing - down over 20% in a month, recovering over the last week. Three members of this group landing inside it is a fact about composition, not a signal about the sector.

There is a counter-example on the range-width side too. The 2.025x on ASTSB is the 3rd widest in its own 10-name cohort, and neither of the two above it is a space or materials name:

The 2.658x on AXTIB is not a finding of this report. The group 2 piece on the denominator trap already used it to show that a leverage multiple is not a predictor of volatility - an unleveraged common stock with a range wider than the 2x MUUB (2.223x) listed on the same day. This report cites that conclusion rather than re-deriving it.

What can be added is where it sits in a wider frame: among the 46 instruments listed 100 days or more, AXTIB is the 6th widest, and all five names wider than it are leveraged ETFs (INTWB 5.583x, SNXXB 3.243x, MVLLB 3.075x, SOXLB 2.892x, KORUB 2.669x). It is the only common stock in the top six of that width table. And its own cohort (2026-07-20, 10 names) contains 6 leveraged ETFs - a batch built for wide ranges, inside which an unleveraged common stock ranks 5th widest.

One more counter-example from inside the group: AXTIB has both the widest range here (2.658x) and the best 7 days (+5.50%). A wide range does not mean still falling.

5. Size explains the direction, not the order

The direction is inverted: the largest cap, RKLBB, has the lowest turnover, and the smallest, RDDTB, the highest on the group and 6th on the book. That is the denominator effect the group 2 report took apart - turnover is 24-hour volume divided by market cap, and a small denominator inflates the ratio by construction.

But the order is not monotonic, and that part the denominator effect cannot explain: AXTIB carries 1.65 times the market cap of ASTSB and 62% more turnover (1.577x against 0.971x). If turnover were purely a function of the denominator, a larger denominator would give a smaller ratio. So there is real volume contributing to the AXTIB row.

Pulling absolute volume out on its own makes that clearer:

• AXTIB trades $4.74M in a day, 27th on the book, more than RKLBB at three times its market cap ($3.68M, 35th). The AXTIB cap is 33% of the RKLBB cap and its volume is 1.29 times as large.
• The 3.695x turnover on RDDTB comes with $1.71M of absolute volume, 63rd on the book. Its cap ranks 96th and its volume 63rd, a gap of 33 places - real, but weaker than the AXTIB case of a volume rank 19 places above its cap rank.

So the activity order in this group is: AXTIB (real volume) > RDDTB (small denominator plus a violent day) > ASTSB ≈ APPB > RKLBB (largest cap, least traded). Sorting on the turnover column puts RDDTB first, and its absolute volume is 36% of the AXTIB figure.

6. Structure: what these five tokens actually are

All of this comes from the issuer record on this site rather than being invented here:

• The wrapper is a tracker certificate, issued by BTech Holdings Limited as formally listed certificates under ADGM / FSRA - not equity.
• No voting rights.
• Dividends are pass-through: 30% US withholding first, then reinvested via a multiplier. This single line determines the first point of section 8.
• Reserves are covered by attestation, not on-chain proof of reserve. For comparison, xStocks uses Chainlink proof of reserve, refreshed daily or when reserves move more than 10%, verifiable on chain; an attestation is not.
• Redemption is available, KYC required, $5 minimum. (The xStocks primary redemption minimum is $5,000.)
• US persons are blocked.
• A single chain in BNB Chain, traded only on Binance, deposits supported only over BSC - sending over the wrong network loses the asset.
• The issuance model is exchange-self: the issuing entity and the sole trading venue are the same party.

All five underlyings here are US-listed common stock - no ETFs, no ADRs, no leveraged products. That matters for section 4: none of the drawdown in this group contains leverage decay.

APPB deserves a note of its own, because it is one of the newest instruments on this snapshot. It listed on 2026-10-26 against a snapshot timestamp of 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z - its entire existence is 5 days long. On the book, 15 instruments have been listed under 30 days and 11 under 20, and the 15 instruments that listed in 2026-10 hold only $11.34M of combined market cap while turning over 1.85 times as fast as the earliest cohort. A 5-day-old instrument is not an anomaly on this book; it is what a book in expansion looks like.

The no-voting-rights line has a concrete meaning for these particular underlyings. Several of these companies are in heavy capital deployment phases (rocket launch, satellite constellations), and financing and share-dilution decisions at companies like that go to shareholder votes in public markets - holders of these tokens are absent from every one of them. That is not an accusation; it is what the wrapper is.

7. This snapshot was taken on a Saturday

The timestamp 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z is a Saturday morning UTC. The US cash market closed Friday at 20:00 UTC and does not reopen until Monday.

This has already been quantified once on this issuer: one stock, four books laid the four tokenized versions of AAPL side by side on a Saturday and concluded that a quote outside trading hours is a market maker opinion, not a market price.

So the 24-hour changes here read as follows: that window (Friday 06:06 UTC to Saturday 06:06 UTC) contains a full Friday US session, so it is not a pure closed-market quote; but the snapshot itself lands inside the closed window, and for the two days and more between it and the Monday open, these token prices are the only prices these names have.

For the conclusion in section 3, this is a real limit. The −12.81% on RDDTB and the −8.70% on APPB are the two deepest in the group on the day, and the back half of that window has the underlying already closed. So "RDDTB was still falling at the moment of this snapshot" needs a qualifier: it was still falling on the quotes of this venue - the underlying does not get priced again until Monday.

8. What this method cannot compute

First, no premium or discount. The snapshot holds only the token price, not an underlying reference price. More importantly, the dividend mechanism is "30% US withholding first, then reinvested via a multiplier" - without knowing the current multiplier, the token price and the share price are not comparable to begin with. So this report gives no premium figure at all.

Second, how many shares one token represents cannot be computed. The snapshot holds no conversion ratio, so circulating supply cannot be converted into any share count.

Third, the range-width windows are not equal length. The five here are 110 / 103 / 88 / 46 / 5 days - only RKLBB and AXTIB qualify for the 46-name "listed 100 days or more" list (AXTIB 6th widest, RKLBB 22nd). The 2.025x on ASTSB, 1.834x on RDDTB and 1.211x on APPB cannot be compared against mature instruments.

Fourth, for an instrument listed under 30 days, its "30-day" field covers less than 30 days. On the book 15 instruments have been listed under 30 days and 11 under 20 - APPB has only 5, and its identical 7-day and 30-day fields (both −16.11%) are the example this report used to prove the field is clipped. The four with complete windows here are RKLBB, AXTIB, ASTSB and RDDTB; the book 30-day median of −16.71% cited above, and every rank, contain those 15 clipped values.

Fifth, market cap is the CMC definition: price times circulating supply. The $1,318.38M book total above is the sum of these 100 rows, while the bStocks row on the /stocks page of this site shows an on-chain size of $914M - two numbers from different sources at different moments, which will not reconcile.

Sixth, 100 of 105. CMC reports 105 instruments, the snapshot in hand holds 100, and the missing 5 appear in no statistic here.

Seventh, this snapshot holds only three points in time, so it cannot reconstruct a path. The 24-hour, 7-day and 30-day changes plus the post-listing high and low support only the coarse judgment of section 3 - they can tell you whether the damage sits in the final week or earlier, but not what shape the move took in between, and not which day the high was set. Half the reason the −43.4% on AXTIB and the −43.9% on RDDTB cannot be compared directly is exactly this: the dates of those two highs are not in this data.

Conclusion. Four names in this group are at almost the same drawdown depth (36.4% to 45.3% below their highs, all deeper than the book median of 27.1%), and the direction of the last week is opposite: AXTIB +5.50%, RKLBB +5.13% and ASTSB +3.24% against RDDTB −36.40%. That RDDTB 7-day loss being larger than its own 30-day loss means the whole month of damage is compressed into the final week, and it fell another −12.81% in 24 hours.

What is worth taking away is a way of reading: "how far below the high" and "still falling or already bouncing" are independent questions, and one 30-day number can only answer the first. Put −31.51% (a month ago), −36.31% (last week) and −16.11% (5 days of history in total) in the same column and they look like three negative numbers of differing depth.

But the split is not a sector signal. Of the 100 instruments, 21 are simultaneously up over 7 days and down more than 20% over 30 - more than a fifth, spanning semiconductors, storage, optics, AI data centres and leveraged ETFs. This group accounts for 3 of them, which is composition.

The last point is about how to read activity. Sorting on turnover puts RDDTB first in this group (3.695x, 6th on the book), and its absolute volume of $1.71M is 36% of the AXTIB figure. AXTIB, on a third of the RKLBB market cap, produced 29% more volume - the most-traded name in this group is AXTIB, not the one with the highest turnover.

Data from CoinMarketCap, timestamped 2026-10-31T06:06:52Z, covering 100 of the 105 instruments bStocks has reported. Instrument detail and quotes at /stocks/bstocks. This is research, not investment advice. DYOR.